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Abstract 
We analyze the distributive justice of the combined burden of income taxes, social security 
taxes and public transfers on employee households in the United States on the federal level 
and in six member states. To investigate whether the treatment of families by the aggregate 
tax and transfer system can be regarded as “fair”, we compare the equivalent incomes of eight 
different household types. Using the concepts of horizontal equity and system-inherent 
equivalence scales, we find evidence for a privileged treatment of families with children and a 
low market income due to the earned income tax credit (EIC), the child tax credit and the 
supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP). If employment taxes are interpreted as 
taxes in the proper sense, we obtain a favorable treatment of family households and especially 
married couples for middle-sized market incomes. For high market incomes, we observe a 
decreasing privilege for all family types. Regarding state tax and transfer systems, temporary 
aid for needy families (TANF) substantially increases the observed privilege for low-income 
families compared to singles, while the analyzed state income taxes are generally in line with 
the federal tax scheme. Overall, our results imply a significant contradiction in value 
judgments within the U.S. tax and transfer system. 
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Social justice and the poverty of children and families are important subjects of the public 
debate in the United States (e.g. Rainwater and Smeeding, 2003). Within the last decades 
about 20% of the children in the U.S. have been officially poor (Pressman, 2011). As 
instrument to overcome poverty issues, federal, state and local governments have initiated 
public transfer programs, tax credits and allowances to account for the higher income needs of 
families and especially households with children. These include the child tax credit, TANF 
benefits and higher claims for the EIC and SNAP. As Moffitt and Scholz (2009) have shown, 
the level of U.S. social transfer programs expanded significantly in the last decades, affecting 
the distribution of income between different groups of household types. 
Nevertheless, the literature has largely ignored the distributive consequences of these revised 
U.S. transfer and tax programs. While considerable number of contributions have analyzed 
the horizontal equity of the U.S. federal income tax (see for example Seneca and Taussig, 
1971; Habib, 1979; Leuthold and Husby, 1989; Allan and Iglarish, 1996; Auerbach and 
Hassett, 2002; Gravelle and Gravelle, 2006; Bryant et al., 2008), research on corresponding 
aspects of other taxes and transfer payments is scarce (see Stranahan and Borg, 1998 for 
property taxes, Cornia and Slade, 2006 for the lottery tax and Gravelle and Gravelle, 2006 for 
refundable tax credits of the federal income tax). 
Gravelle and Gravelle (2006) analyze federal income taxation (including the EIC and the 
child tax credit) of 14 different types of U.S. households using equivalence scales, and 
conclude that there is a much more favorable tax treatment of low income families with 
children compared to single households. The privilege increases in the number of children and 
results mainly from the child tax credit and higher EIC payments for households with 
children. At higher income levels, Gravelle and Gravelle (2006) find more equal treatment for 
all family types. In this range of incomes, the child tax credit reduces tax penalties for 
families with children. 
Our paper extends the approach of Gravelle and Gravelle (2006) in a number of ways. First, 
we account not only for the federal income tax, but also for payroll taxes of employees and 
the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP) on the federal level. Second, we enrich 
previous research by the use of system-inherent equivalence scales based on implicit value 
judgments of the U.S. federal income tax. Thus, these equivalence scales can be derived from 
the federal income tax code. Third, we consider additional taxes and transfers on the state 
level including state income taxes and the temporary aid for needy families program (TANF). 
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Our methodology allows us to draw conclusions about potential contradictions in value 
judgments within the U.S. tax and transfer system. These include the following aspects: (1) 
different levels of pre-tax material comfort of families in relation to singles; (2) different 
subsystems of the aggregate tax and transfer system (e.g. social security taxes or SNAP) and 
(3) tax and transfer systems in a number of selected member states (e.g. New York) compared 
to the value judgments of the federal system. 
To keep our analysis tractable, we restrict the exposition in a number of ways. (1) Our main 
focus is on employee households. Thus, we do not consider specific tax and transfer 
treatments for other sources of income (e.g. capital income). (2) We consider eight household 
types with one or two adults and zero up to three children. The single household is our point 
of reference. Two adults living in the same household are regarded as married joint filers. (3) 
We consider six U.S. member states which represent different forms of state tax and transfer 
systems. These include California, Florida, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Texas. 
Our investigation is related to a number of other contributions analyzing tax and transfer 
systems. While Muellbauer and Van De Ven (2004) derive implicit equivalence scales for 
Australia, Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) investigate the horizontal equity of the German tax-
benefit system for employee households. Furthermore, there have been studies investigating 
tax and transfer systems in the U.S. and European countries without addressing horizontal 
equity (Bernhardt and Holtzblatt, 2008; Immervoll et al., 2009; Bargain et al., 2011). 
To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the combined burden of the U.S. federal income 
tax, state income taxes, social security taxes and public transfer programs (SNAP and TANF) 
from a horizontal equity perspective. Furthermore, we identify potential contradictions within 
the U.S. tax and transfer system by the use of system-inherent equivalence scales and report 
simulation results for the marginal and the average tax and transfer burden on the federal level 
for eight household types.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical background on 
horizontal equity and the applied concept of equivalent income taxation. Section 3 
exemplifies the simulated tax and transfer system on the federal level and on the state level 
(governing law in the tax year of 2010). The results on horizontal equity are presented in 
section 4 and the main findings are recapitulated in section 5. The appendices include 




2. Basic concepts 
2.1. Distributive justice of a tax and transfer system 
We define F  as a function of the tax and transfer system, encompassing taxes on income, 
social security taxes and public transfers. The sum of taxes T  includes the federal income tax, 
state income taxes and corresponding tax credits like the EIC. The tax function depends on 
the market income iy  and the composition i  of a household i , with  1, 2A  denoting the 
number of adults and  0,1, 2,3C  denoting the number of children. The frequencies of these 
eight household types are displayed in Table 1 and cover about 76% of the U.S. population. 
The remaining 24% are typically households with three or more adults.1 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In the case of employee households, the most important group of taxpayers, a considerable 
reduction of disposable income results from social security taxes. According to international 
standards (OECD, 2012), the combined compulsory social security taxes S  of employers and 
employees are interpreted as taxes on wage income. This approach is not problematic as long 
as the marginal contribution is not adequately compensated by insurance benefits and the 
employee bears economically the burden of social security taxes.   
As documented by Gruber (1997), there is evidence that the incidence of payroll taxation falls 
mainly on the employee. Furthermore, it can be argued that public insurance contributions do 
not generally mirror a fair price for insurance entitlements (Moffitt and Scholz, 2009). This 
perspective may be justified by insurance benefits for spouses and children, the existence of a 
minimum pension (SSCI) and other distributional aspects and is supported by the simulation 
results of Steuerle and Rennane (2011) who provide evidence for a strong redistribution 
within the U.S. social security system.2  
Thus, we generally consider social security taxes to be part of the U.S. tax and transfer 
system. Nevertheless, we also calculate a specification excluding corresponding burdens 
(Appendix A). This alternative setting accounts for the effect of not interpreting contributions 
for the hospital insurance and the age, survivors and disability insurance as taxes. In addition, 
                                                 
1  We have to take into account that there is no joint filing for households with three and more adults. 
Therefore, these households cannot be taken as tax-relevant units, but have to be separated in sub-units with 
one or two adults for tax purposes. 
2  The effect of redistribution holds especially for the age, the family type and the composition of a household’s 
income. For example, the estimated net benefit (gross benefit minus contributions paid) is much higher for 
single income earners compared to two-income earners. 
 5
 
this scenario is relevant for self-employed taxpayers who do not face corresponding 
payments.  
Furthermore, we account for public transfers Z  (e.g. SNAP), which can be taken as a 
negative tax payment. Formalized we obtain 
       , , , ,i i i i i i i iF y T y S y Z y      . (1) 
For further analysis the combined tax and transfer function  ,i iF y   can be treated like an 
ordinary tax function (Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 2004). Deducting F  from market income 
we attain the disposable income of household i  
   , , .  i i i i ix y y F y  (2) 
The distributive justice of a tax system as well as a tax and transfer system can be defined by 
vertical and horizontal equity. Vertical equity of a tax and transfer system is subject to a 
social welfare function based on a fundamental paradigm of social justice (Atkinson, 1970). 
In contrast, the equal treatment of equals (horizontal equity) can at least in theory be regarded 
as a basic requirement for a just tax and transfer system (Musgrave, 1990; for the pitfalls of 
this concept see Kaplow, 1989).  
In spite of this general statement, the implementation of horizontal equity is associated with a 
number of major challenges. First of all, our analysis requires the identification of households 
with an equal pre-tax material comfort. Second, we need to substantiate an equal tax and 
treatment of these equivalent single and family households. Furthermore, corresponding 
measures should allow for a quantitative interpretation. 
The identification of equals is not straightforward. It requires a measure to compare the 
material comfort of singles and families. A corresponding instrument that is widely accepted 
for the distributional analysis of households differing in size and needs is the concept of 
equivalent income (Vickery, 1947; Ebert and Moyes, 2000; Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 
2004). 
 
2.2. Equal treatment of equals 
We define r  and k  as two households with a different composition  r k  . The single 
household r  is our point of reference  1 0r A C  . Under these assumptions we call a market 
income ky  equivalent to ry  if it grants the members of the households k  and r  an equal 
level of material comfort. Formalized this can be written as 
 , k k rE y y ,  (3) 
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with E  describing the equivalent income function, which will take the form of an equivalence 
scale. 
The market income ky  and the equivalent income  ,k kE y   are connected by two 
fundamental effects (Donaldson and Pendakur, 2004; Gravelle and Gravelle, 2006): (1) the 
basic needs of a household k  increase in the number of household members, resulting in a 
decrease of the equivalent income in relation to r ; (2) this effect is to some extent offset by 
positive within-household size economies resulting from the fact that some goods are not 
exclusive in consumption and can be pooled on the household level. Hence, the marginal 
price for material comfort decreases in the number of household members. Examples for 
goods not exclusive in consumption are cars, an internet flat rate or housing costs. Positive 
within-household size economies have been substantiated by a considerable number of 
theoretical studies based on consumption models (for a review see Schröder, 2009) as well as 
by empirical surveys (Koulovatianos et al., 2009 with further references). 
The choice of an equivalence scale is basically a value judgment. For that reason, we rely on 
regulations of the U.S. federal income tax code to construct a benchmark for our 
investigation. This approach allows us to draw conclusions about potential contradictions of 
value judgments within the U.S. tax and transfer system. To construct our equivalence scales, 
we focus solely on the federal income tax. This is due to the following aspects: (1) State 
income taxes and programs (TANF) do provide as useful yardstick for the overall system. (2) 
In case of social security taxes, there are no family-specific regulations that could be used as a 
benchmark. (3) The scope of the federal SNAP program is rather limited as SNAP payments 
are not sufficient to allow for a reasonable maintenance (see Table 4 for SNAP benefits). 
The Internal Revenue Code accounts for a number of family-specific deductions to calculate 
the federal taxable income. These include the standard deductions in I.R.C. §63 of $5,700 for 
singles, $8,400 for heads of households and $11,400 for married joint filers (governing law 
December 2010). In addition, there are personal exemptions of $3,650 for each household 
member (I.R.C. §151). Accounting for these family-specific deductions, federal taxable 
income can be interpreted as a form of equivalent pre-tax income for a specific household 
type. Thus, we may use these inherent value judgments to construct equivalence scales 
serving as our point-of-reference. 
Constructing the equivalence scales, we do not account for additional and more complex 
regulations of the federal income tax like the child tax credit, the earned income tax credit 
(EIC) and the alternative minimum tax (AMT). This can be justified by the following 
arguments. First of all, the focus of these regulations is typically restricted to a range of 
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market incomes. For example, the EIC is relevant for low-income households, the AMT and 
the child tax credit is phased out for gross incomes exceeding $75,000.  
Furthermore, these additional regulations do not include value judgments that are fully in line 
with the concepts of horizontal equity and equivalent income taxation. That holds especially 
for the EIC. For example, the maximum EIC in the tax year of 2010 is $457 for a single 
household, $3,050 for a head of household and $457 for a married couple. Unless a couple 
can live as cheap as a single while maintaining the same standard of living, it is obvious that 
these numbers do not reflect the material needs of the corresponding household types. 
By contrast, the deductions in I.R.C. §63 and I.R.C. §151 can be taken as a consistent 
benchmark for the material needs of different family households from the perspective of the 
U.S. legislator. The deduction amounts are reported in Table 2.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The deduction amounts displayed in Table 2 match the needs to construct two simple 
equivalence scales representing different assumptions on within-household size economies. If 
we interpret the additional need of a family household as relative, we obtain a constant 
relative equivalence scale (in the following relative scale). For example, the deduction 
amount of a single parent with one child (A1C1) is $15,700 compared to $9,350 for a single 
household. That implies a necessary increase in income of 68% to obtain the same level of 
material comfort. A relative and constant equivalence scale implies that within-household size 
economies do not vary with the amount of income. Thus, it abstracts from a positive 
relationship of within-household size economies and the household’s disposable income that 
has been stated by Donaldson and Pendakur (2004). Formalized this can be written as  
   ,  iR i i i
yE y
m
  ,  (4) 
where the deflator m  depends exclusively on the household type i  and is typically smaller 
than the number of household members.  
As an alternative, we construct a constant and absolute equivalence scale (in the following 
absolute scale). This scale type assumes a fixed income amount for each additional household 
member to maintain the household’s level of material comfort. This fits well with the 
deduction amounts of the I.R.C. presented by Table 2. For example, the child of A1C1 
increases the necessary disposable income by $6,350.  
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Contrasting the relative scale, the additional income amounts of an absolute scale do not 
depend on income. For example, a household with a disposable income of $100.000 (high 
income household) requires the same additional income amount for one child ($6,350) as a 
household with a disposable income of $20.000. This implies an indefinite elasticity of 
within-household size economies with regards to income. Thus, the additional welfare of the 
high income earner household of $80.000 improves the material comfort of the child without 
any additional cost. 
Therefore, both scales can be taken as two extreme forms of a potential set of equivalence 
scales. Formalized an absolute scale can be written as  
          iA i i i i i i
yE y , y a
m y ,
. (5) 
with  ia θ  denoting the required additional income amount. As exemplified by (5) the 
absolute scale can be interpreted as an income-dependent relative equivalence scale with the 
deflator  i im y ,θ . 
A limitation of an absolute and constant equivalence scale lies in the fact that low market 
incomes result in zero or even negative values of equivalent income. For that reason, we 
restrict our absolute scale to a maximum deflator  iiym ,  for low incomes of the reference 
household. Our point of reference are singles with an AGI of $9,350 and family households 
with an equivalent pre-tax income (for example $15,700 for A1C1). The calculation of an 
absolute equivalence scale for lower income values does not yield reasonable results. 
Therefore, the maximum deflator  iiym ,  equals by construction the value of the relative 
scale (for a thorough discussion see Bönke and Eichfelder, 2010). The income-dependent 
deflators of the absolute scale are documented by Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 about here]   
 
Based on the absolute scale and the relative scale, we are able to identify for each level of 
market income a two-or-more-person household with an equal pre-tax material comfort as the 
reference one-person household   rkk yyE , . Once pre-tax equals are identified, we need 
a definition of an equal treatment. According to Lambert (2004), there are three important 
possibilities in case of a tax system: (1) equal absolute burden, (2) equal average burden and 
(3) equal post-tax material comfort.  
 9
 
However, as has been argued by Muellbauer and Van De Ven (2004) and Bönke and 
Eichfelder (2010), the first and the third approach are not well-suited for the analysis of an 
aggregate tax and transfer system encompassing social transfer programs.3 Therefore, we 
focus on criterion (2), which requires an equal average tax and transfer payment. This can be 
written as 
      
 
k k rk k r r
k r k k
F E y ,θ ,θF y ,θ F y ,θ
y y E y ,θ   or 








yx  ,,  . (6) 
Using conditions (4), (5) and (6), we are able to derive a criterion for an equal treatment of 
different household types in case of an equal pre-tax material comfort 
 








     for      rkk yyE , , (7) 
with  m  depending exclusively on kθ  in case of the relative scale. 
Thus, we measure horizontal equity by the equivalent post-tax family income of the family 
household    k k k kx y ,θ m y ,θ  in relation to the post-tax income of the single household 
 r rx y ,θ . For 1HE , the treatment of k  meets the principle of horizontal equity in relation 
to the single. In case of 1HE  ( 1HE ), we can state a privilege (a discrimination) of the 
family household. 
 
3. Tax and transfer system 
We calculate the burden of social security taxes, the federal income tax (including tax credits) 
and federal public transfers in form of the supplementary nutrition assistance program 
(SNAP) (governing law December 2010) for market incomes from $0 to $250,000. In 
addition, we account for state income taxes and transfers resulting from the temporary 
assistance for needy families program (TANF) in six U.S. states. The inclusion of TANF 
implies that the maximum eligibility period for this program of typically 60 months has not 
been expired. 
The states of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Texas have been selected to 
include economically important regions and to account for different forms of tax and transfer 
systems. Florida and Texas do not rely on a state income tax, while income tax rates are 
relatively high in New York and California. In addition, TANF transfers are significantly 
                                                 
3  The criteria (1) and (3) yield to contra-intuitive results for households with a negative average tax and 
transfer burden. For example, criterion (1) implies an identical transfer payment for a single household and a 
family with two adults and two children in case of a zero market income (see Muellbauer and Van de Ven, 
2004 and Bönke and Eichfelder, 2010 for a more detailed discussion). 
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higher in California compared to Texas. In New York and Michigan, there exist additional 
EIC payments increasing the level of social welfare. 
We assume that a household’s gross earnings are generated by employment income (see 
Appendix A for an alternative specification). Thus, market income iy  can be defined as the 
sum of the gross wage Giy  and the social security taxes of the employer 
EM
iS . We do not 
consider earnings from other sources (e.g. capital income) and do not account for unearned 
income. In addition, we expect that income is constant over the whole period under 
consideration to calculate transfer programs on a yearly basis.  
As has been mentioned, we simulate the tax and transfer burden of eight household types. 
Two adults living in one household are regarded as married joint filers for income tax 
purposes, while single parents are considered as heads of households. Children live in the 
parents’ household and are qualifying children in terms of the child tax credit, the EIC and 
TANF. We assume further that the market income is generated by one household member 
only. This assumption affects the maximum contribution limits for the age, survivors and 
disability insurance. Therefore, we include an alternative scenario in Appendix B, where the 
market income is split evenly in case of married joint filers. 
 
3.1. Federal tax and transfer system 
3.1.1. Social security taxes 
The basis of assessment for social security taxes is the gross wage Giy . Up to a gross wage of 
$106,800, the employer and the employee pay social security taxes with a marginal rate of 
6.2% for the old age, survivors and disability insurance. In addition, there are payments for 
the hospital insurance with a marginal rate of 1.45% (I.R.C. §3101). As the impact of the 
Federal Unemployment Act (FUTA) on disposable income is small, we neglect corresponding 
payments. Due to the contribution ceiling for the old age, survivors and disability insurance, 
social security taxes are regressive. While households with a gross income up to $106,800 
(respectively a market income of $114,970) face a marginal burden of 15.30% of gross 
income (14.21% of market income), the marginal burden is 2.90% of gross income (2.85% of 
market income) for earnings exceeding that limit. The effective contribution ceiling is higher 
for two-income earner households as the contributions are calculated for each income earner 
separately (see Appendix B). 
If only one household member generates the family’s market income, the family structure 
does not affect the social security tax due. The sum of social security taxes of the employer 
and the employee can be written as  
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 ,  WE EMi i i iS y S S , (8) 
with WEiS  denoting the social security taxes of the employee. The relationship of market 
income iy  and gross wage 
G
iy  is illustrated by (9). In this equation C

 describes the 
contribution ceiling of social security taxes for old age, survivors and disability insurance of 
$106,800 being enlarged by the social security taxes of the employer (altogether about 
$114,970), EMos  the employer’s marginal rate for the old age, survivors and disability 




















3.1.2. Federal income tax 
In addition to employment taxes, the gross wage Giy  is debited by federal income tax 
payments. Under the conditions of our model, the gross wage is identical to the gross income 
(I.R.C. §61) and the adjusted gross income (I.R.C. §62). Taxable income is calculated by the 
gross income, which is reduced by the standard deduction in I.R.C. §63 and personal 
exemptions in I.R.C. §151. The tax payment is calculated corresponding to I.R.C. §1.  
We assume for simplicity that the household uses the standard deduction in I.R.C. §63. This 
may be justified as follows. First of all, any assumption on the amount of itemized deductions 
is somewhat arbitrary as these deductions depend on the taxpayer characteristics. 
Furthermore, itemized deductions result partially from expenses reducing a household’s 
material comfort. Therefore, itemized deductions should not only be considered in calculating 
taxable income, but also in calculating pre-tax income. If we assume a similar impact on both 
measures, itemized deductions should be a minor issue with regards to horizontal equity.4 
The alternative minimum tax (AMT) is calculated as provided by I.R.C. §55. The assessment 
base is the taxable excess, respectively the alternative taxable income minus the exemption 
amount in I.R.C. §55 (d). In our simulation, alternative taxable income is equal to the gross 
wage. The tax rate is 26% for a taxable excess up to $175,000 and 28% for any earnings 
above. The exemption amount is phased out at a rate of 25% for alternative minimum taxable 
income exceeding $112,500 (in case of married joint filers $150,000). 
                                                 
4  If  pre-tax material comfort would be unaffected by itemized deductions, itemization results in a more equal 
treatment for all household types (Gravelle and Gravelle, 2006). 
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Disposable income is increased by the making work pay credit (I.R.C. §36A), which is 
refundable and equal to the minimum of 6.2% of the gross income and $400. The credit is 
phased out with a rate of 2% for gross wages exceeding $75,000. In case of married joint 
filers, the maximum credit is $800 and the phase-out limit is $150,000. 
Families with children receive a child tax credit according to I.R.C. §24 up to a maximum of 
$1,000 per child and year. The maximum refundable credit is 15% of the taxpayer’s earned 
income as it exceeds an amount of $3,000. In case of households with three children, the 
maximum refundable credit may also be higher if the difference of social security taxes over 
the earned income tax credit according to I.R.C. §32 exceeds the regular refundable child tax 
credit. The child tax credit is phased-out with a rate of 5% if the adjusted gross income 
exceeds $75,000 ($110,000 in case of married joint filers).5 
Households with a low market income receive an earned income tax credit (EIC). The EIC is 
paid as a surcharge to earned income and is significantly higher for households with children. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the phase-in rate, the phase-in amount, the phase-out rate, the 
phase-out amount and the maximum benefit for the household types considered. The 
assessment base for the phase-in rate is earned income up to the phase-in amount, while the 
phase-out rate is applied to earned income minus the phase-out amount. The credit is 
calculated corresponding to I.R.C. §32. However, the phase-in amount, the phase-out amount 
and the maximum earned income to receive a benefit are based on the tables in IRS (2010a). 
A more detailed description of the credit is given by IRS (2010b). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
3.1.3. Supplemental nutrition assistance program 
Regarding the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), families are treated as a 
community in need. As a result, all payments are adjusted to the material needs of the 
household as a whole. The household members are liable for each other. The household is 
eligible for SNAP if it meets the gross income test and the net income test. Hence, gross 
income and net income must not exceed the corresponding income amounts. In our 
simulation, the SNAP-relevant net income is equal to 80% of gross income minus a standard 
deduction of $142 per month ($1,704 per year). In case of households with more than three 
                                                 
5  According to the Internal Revenue Code, the child tax credit is phased out in steps of $50 per $1,000 adjusted 
gross income. As a corresponding approach results in a considerable number of marginal rates of more than 
100%, it would lead to confusing figures of the marginal tax and transfer rate. Therefore, we approximate the 
phase-out regulations by a constant phase-out rate of 5%. 
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members the standard deduction is $153 per month ($1,836 per year). We do not account for 
additional deductions like the dependent care deduction or the deduction for excess shelter 
costs. 
SNAP benefits are calculated as the maximum benefit of a household type minus 30% of net 
income as calculated for SNAP purposes. The gross income amount, the net income amount 
and the maximum benefit are given in Table 4. As we assume a constant market income over 
the whole period under consideration, SNAP operating numbers are provided on a yearly 
basis. The maximum benefit depends exclusively on the number of household members, but 
not on the composition of a household. Hence, an adult and a child receive the same benefit 
amount. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
3.2. Taxes and transfers on the state level 
3.2.1. State income taxes 
There are substantial differences among the state income tax regimes in the states considered. 
First, Florida and Texas do not have income tax systems. In California, which does have a 
state income tax, taxable income is equal to adjusted gross income (in our simulation equal to 
the gross wage) minus a standard deduction of $3,670 ($7,340 in case of married joint filers). 
The tax rate is progressive with scales for single filers (A1C0), heads of households (A1C1 to 
A1C3) and married joint filers (A2C0 to A2C3). The marginal tax rate varies from 1.25% to 
9.55% of state taxable income. 
In Michigan, taxable income is defined as adjusted gross income minus a personal exemption 
of $3,600 for each household member. The constant tax rate is 4.35%. There are no standard 
deductions and no specific tax scales for married joint filers and heads of households. 
However, there is an additional earned income tax credit equal to 20% of the federal EIC. 
New York taxable income is defined as federal adjusted gross income minus a standard 
deduction and a personal exemption of $1,000 per household member. The standard 
deduction is $7,500 for single filers, $10,500 for heads of households and $15,000 for married 
joint filers. The tax rate is progressive with a separate tax scale for single filers (A1C0), heads 
of households (A1C1 to A1C3) and married joint filers (A2C0 to A2C3). The marginal rate 
varies from 4.00% to 8.97%. There is an additional earned income tax credit equal to 30% of 
the federal EIC. 
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Ohio taxable income is defined as federal adjusted gross income reduced by a personal 
exemption of $1,600 per household member. The uniform tax scale is progressive with an 
initial marginal rate of 4.00% and a maximum marginal rate of 6.24%. There is no standard 
deduction. However, we account for the Ohio tax credit for exemptions and the Ohio tax 
credit for taxpayers with AGI lower than §10,000. 
 
3.2.2. Temporary assistance for needy families 
Similar to SNAP, families are treated as a community in need in terms of the TANF program. 
Hence, all payments are adjusted to the material needs of the household as a whole. In our 
simulation, TANF payments are exclusively available for families with children. Hence, we 
do not account for TANF payments for pregnant women. A household is eligible for TANF if 
it meets the corresponding income eligibility criteria. In general, there is an initial eligibility 
test for the first time to receive TANF and a continued eligibility test for repeated payments. 
Due to the fact that we calculate TANF on a yearly basis, we restrict our analysis on the 
continued eligibility tests. 
In California, a household is not eligible if the gross earned income exceeds the monthly 
recipient’s maximum income amount.6 Due to the fact that TANF benefits are reduced by a 
household’s earnings, there is also no TANF payment if the gross income of a household 
minus earned income disregard exceeds the maximum benefit. The earned income disregard is 
equal to $225 per month ($2,700 per year) plus 50% of any additional earned income. 
In New York, there is a two-stage eligibility test. First of all, gross income must not exceed 
the adjusted federal poverty level.7 Second, gross income minus earned income disregard 
must not exceed 185% of the New York standard of need. In addition, the TANF benefit is 
reduced by gross income minus earned income disregard. The earned income disregard is 
defined as $90 per month ($1,080 per year) plus 52% of any additional earned income. 
In Texas, there is only a test with regards to gross income minus the earned income disregard. 
For the continued eligibility test, this amount must not exceed the recognizable needs 
depending on the household size and the household’s composition. The Texas earned income 
disregard is $120 per month ($1,440 per year). We do not account for the additional disregard 
in Texas of 90% of additional earned income up to $1,400 per year that is only relevant for 
the first four months of TANF eligibility. 
                                                 
6  There are two maximum amounts for different regions in California. In our simulation, we use the limits for 
region 1, which are slightly higher. 
7  As the federal poverty level is adjusted for the earned income disregard, this test is in fact relevant for the 
unadjusted gross income. 
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In Florida, Michigan and Ohio, there is only an eligibility test for the maximum benefit 
compared to the gross income reduced by the earned income disregard. Hence, we calculate a 
TANF payment if the gross income minus earned income disregard does not exceed the 
maximum benefit. The Florida earned income disregard is $200 per month ($2,400 per year) 
plus 50% of any additional earned income. The corresponding disregard in Michigan is $200 
per month ($2,400 per year) plus 20% the remainder. The Ohio earned income disregard is 
$250 per month ($3,000 per year) plus 50% of any additional earned income. 
There is a considerable variance of maximum TANF benefits of the six member states that are 
documented by Table 5. As we assume a constant market income over the whole period under 
consideration, the maximum benefits are given on a yearly basis. Maximum benefits are high 
in California and New York and low in Florida and Texas. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
3.4. Tax and transfer burden on the federal level 
We analyze the tax and transfer function F  of the household type i  in relation to gross 










Figure 2 illustrates if  and iF  of the federal tax and transfer system for households with one 
adult and zero to three children as a function of market income iy . Average and marginal 
rates below 0% (exceeding 100%) are generally restricted to a minimum value of -50% 
(maximum value of 110%). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
For iy  < $9,950, the average rate of the single household 1 0A Cf  is negative as a result of 
public transfers from SNAP, the EIC and the making work pay credit. For higher market 
incomes, the average rate increases sharply up to a level of 12.5% for a market income of 
about $13,000 and, with a moderate slope, to a level of 32.5% for a market income of about 
$115,000. For higher market incomes, we find a very small increase in the average rate. 
The marginal rate is initially close to zero as a result of social security taxes being 
compensated by the EIC and the making work pay credit. However, for market incomes 
ranging from $2,300 to about $10,000 the marginal rate increases in a number of steps to a 
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maximum of 52.9%. This is due to the imputation of earned income against SNAP benefits, 
the ending of the making work pay credit’s phase-in, the phase-out of the EIC and the start-up 
of the regular federal income tax payment. The decrease to a marginal rate of 23.5% is due to 
the expiration of SNAP for market incomes exceeding $13,050, and the EIC for market 
incomes exceeding $14,500. 
The following increase in the marginal rate for market incomes up to a maximum of 42.1% 
results from the progressive federal income tax scale and the phase-out of the making work 
pay credit. The sharp reduction of the marginal rate from 40.2% to 30.5% for market incomes 
exceeding $114,970 is caused by the contribution ceiling for the old age, survivors and 
disability insurance. At a market income of about $190,500, the marginal rate increases again 
to a level of 35.4% due to the fourth federal income tax bracket for a taxable income 
exceeding $171,850. 
For households with children, we find in general a similar pattern. Due to the higher SNAP 
and EIC, the child tax credit and deductions, the average and the marginal rate are lower. The 
initial marginal rate is even negative. In addition, we obtain marginal rates of more than 100% 
resulting from a negative SNAP eligibility test. Due to the higher SNAP benefit amount for 
families, there is a broader income range relevant for a SNAP phase-out. Therefore, we 
observe market incomes with a negative SNAP eligibility test, resulting in a full loss of the 
remaining SNAP benefit. This implies a sharp increase in the average rate.  
The average and the marginal rate for the federal tax and transfer system regarding 
households with two adults are presented by Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In general, average rates are smaller due to higher public transfers (SNAP), higher tax credits 
and a lower tax rate for married joint filers. As the amount of the SNAP benefit increases in 
family size, we find even for the household type A2C0 marginal rates exceeding 100% due to 
the full loss of the remaining SNAP benefit. By contrast, the reduction of the marginal rate 
caused by the contribution ceiling of social security taxes is not affected by the family type in 
case of one-income earner (see Appendix B for two-income-earner households). 
Concluding, the average rate is clearly progressive with a degrading slope. Marginal rates are 
initially low (even negative for families with children), but increase sharply by reason of the 
phase-out of the SNAP program and the EIC. For market incomes of more than $25,000, there 
is no clear upwards or downwards trend in marginal tax rates. This is a result of the phase-out 
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of tax credits, the AMT and the contribution ceiling of social security taxes counterbalancing 
the progressive income tax scale. 
For expositional reasons, we refrain from reporting the tax and transfer systems for the six 
federal states considered. Generally it can be stated that TANF and state EIC decrease the 
average burden for low income households, while state income taxes increase the burden of 
high income households. Furthermore, the phase-out of the TANF counterbalances the phase-
in effect of the EIC. 
 
4. Horizontal equity 
In the following we present our results on HE . Using the absolute scale and the relative scale 
introduced in Section 2.2, we identify for each household k of a family type k  a reference 
household with an equivalent pre-tax market income   rkk yyE , . Thereafter, we 
calculate the net tax and transfer burden for both households according to Section 3. Our 
criterion of horizontal equity is documented by formula (7). 
We illustrate HE  for equivalent market incomes of all household types. 1HE   1HE  
indicates a privilege (discrimination) of the corresponding family household k. In quantitative 
terms an 1 1HE .  means that a family household could forego 10% of its equivalent post-tax 
income to obtain the same post-tax material comfort as a single with an equivalent pre-tax 
income. Thus, HE  values of 1.1 imply a significant privilege. 
 
4.1. Federal tax and transfer system 
Figure 4 illustrates HE  for the absolute scale and the relative scale. The results are not fully 
identical, but nevertheless similar. For both scales we obtain a significant privilege for all 
family types with children in case of low market incomes. This is driven by three divergent 
aspects: (1) The child tax credit, (2) the considerably higher EIC payments for households 
with children and (3) the fact that SNAP provides the same benefits for adult household 
members and children.8  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
8  By contrast, the federal income tax law as our point of reference assumes that the material needs of children 
are lower. This is in line with empirical evidence and widely-used equivalence scales (Donaldson and 
Pendakur 2004, Gravelle and Gravelle 2006, Koulovatianos et al. 2009). 
 18
 
There is also a clear disadvantage for low-income married couples without children. This is 
due to the low EIC payments (the maximum benefit is the same as for the single household) 
and the fact that SNAP accounts to a higher degree for within-household size economies as 
the equivalence scales for A2C0. Concluding, HE  is up to 40% higher than 1 for households 
with children (with the strongest effect for A1C3) and about 10% lower 1 for A2C0. 
For middle-income earners, we observe initially a trend towards an equal treatment for all 
family types  1HE , which is caused by the phase-out of SNAP and of the EIC. However, 
we observe again an increasing privilege for equivalent market incomes exceeding $50,000. 
This effect is strong for married couples and results from the contribution ceiling of the old 
age, survivors and disability insurance at a market income ( equivalent income) of $114,970. 
As social security taxes are in fact regressive, singles pay a higher average burden than 
families with an equivalent pre-tax income. It has to be noted that the expected social security 
benefits of family households are typically higher (Steuerle and Renanne, 2011). This effect 
fades out reflecting a tendency for horizontal equity in case of high market incomes. 
The main difference between the absolute scale and the relative scale can be observed for 
heads of households with an equivalent income of about $50,000. While the relative scale 
implies a slight disadvantage for this household group, the absolute scale states a clear 
privilege. This divergence results from different assumptions on the elasticity of within-
household size economies with regards to disposable income in case of the absolute scale 
(indefinite elasticity) and the relative scale (zero elasticity). 
In addition to the baseline case, we made calculations disregarding social security taxes 
(Appendix A) and accounting for dual-income earners (Appendix B). Appendix A is relevant 
if there are no social security taxes of if corresponding contributions are not interpreted as 
taxes. We still find a (somewhat smaller) privilege of high income families for the absolute 
scale. For the relative scale, we obtain a (slight) discrimination of high-income families 
compared to a clear privilege of this group in the baseline case. Thus, social security taxes 
have a strong impact on horizontal equity and imply a privilege for families. 
For two-income earners, we obtain a significantly smaller advantage of high income married 
couples compared to singles. That documents a discrimination of dual-income earners 
compared to households with only one-income earner. The effect is driven by higher effective 
contribution ceilings for the old age, survivors and disability insurance in case of two-income 
earners. As a result, households with two-income earners and a high market income pay up to 




4.2. Taxes and transfers on the state level 
In addition to the federal tax and transfer system, we account for TANF benefits and state 
income taxes for six member states. While state income taxes are low compared to the federal 
burden (even zero in case of Florida and Texas), TANF payments can be high compared to 
federal transfer programs. That holds especially for households with a zero market income 
who do not benefit from the child tax credit, the EIC or the making work pay credit. Table 6 
documents SNAP benefits on the federal level and the sum of SNAP benefits and TANF 
maximum payments for each member state. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Obviously benefits for family households are much higher. In California, a single obtains a 
maximum benefit of $2,400, while a head of household with one child (three children) 
receives $11,928 ($19.092). Thus, one child (three children) implies (imply) an increase in the 
social welfare benefits of 397% (696%) or $9,528 ($16.692). As aforementioned, low income 
earners with children seem to be privileged by the federal system. This prerogative is 
extremely expanded if TANF is considered. In Table 7, we present our results for HE  for 
households with a zero market income. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
As should be expected, the privilege is especially high (low) in states with high (low) TANF 
maximum benefits like California and New York (Florida and Texas). Furthermore, the effect 
increases in the number of children and is higher for single parents. Altogether, our results 
document a strong impact of welfare benefits on horizontal equity. 
This can be exemplified for a household with two adults and two children in California 
(A2C2). According to our relative scale (which is identical to the absolute scale in case of 
households with a zero market income), such a household requires 278% of the income of a 
single to obtain an identical material comfort. The maximum SNAP for this household is 
334% of the SNAP for a single household. Including TANF, the relative advantage compared 
to single is even higher (796% of the benefit for singles). 
This divergence between the value judgments on the federal level and on the state level can be 
captured by an additional measure. Taking the value judgments of the federal system as point 
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of reference, we can define the horizontal equity on the state level in relation to the federal 
level by a normalized version of our usual measure for horizontal equity 
 
   
1 S k k
S
k k S r r
x y ,θ
HE
HE m y ,θ x y ,θ       for      rkk yyE , . (10) 
with SHE  denoting the state effect on horizontal equity in relation to the federal level, HE  
the measure for horizontal on the federal level and  S k kx y ,θ  the post-tax income on the 
state level. The calculation of SHE  in relation to the federal system has two major 
advantages. (1) Deviations between the federal system and the state system can be easily 
identified and (2) SHE  provides a quantitative estimate of the deviations. 
Figure 5 contains the results for California. Because of the limited effect of the state income 
taxes, the range of Figure 5 is restricted to a maximum variation of 10 percentage points.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
As aforementioned, California TANF provides a clear privilege even if compared to the 
federal system. By contrast, the horizontal equity implications of the state income tax are 
relatively small and contradictory. While the absolute scale states a privilege for families and 
especially married couples, the relative scale provides evidence for a slight discrimination 
with a relatively small effect for households with a high number of children. Taking into 
account the small deviations, it may be concluded that the state income tax  is broadly in line 
with the value judgments of the federal system. 
The results for the other member states are reported by Appendix C. Apart from TANF, we do 
not find strong deviations from the federal system. Regarding New York and Michigan, there 
are additional EIC payments, which increase the privilege for families with children and a low 
but non-zero market income. We do not find significant effects for middle-sized and high 
market incomes. Thus, the value judgments of the state income taxes considered are largely 
the same as for the federal income tax. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The distributive justice of the tax and transfer system in the United States, as these achieve or 
fall short of horizontal equity in the treatment of families, is the focus of our study. It is the 
first such study to account not only for the federal income tax, but also for additional taxes 
and transfer programs on the federal level and on the state level with a main focus on 
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employment income. In particular we consider social security taxes, the federal income tax, 
the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), as well as state income taxes and 
TANF benefits in California, Florida, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Texas.  
Methodologically, the contribution is based on the concept of needs-adjusted income taxation. 
Using value judgments inherent in the calculation of the federal taxable income, we compare 
the treatment of seven different types of family households with the single as point of 
reference. Furthermore, we analyze deviations of state tax and transfer systems in relation to 
the federal level. This comparative approach allows us to draw conclusions on the consistency 
of the tax and transfer system with regards to three aspects: (1) different levels of income; (2) 
different subsystems and (3) state tax and transfer systems in relation to the federal system. 
Regarding households with a low market income, we find a distinct privilege for single 
parents and couples with children. The effect is driven by SNAP, the child tax credit and 
especially the EIC, which are not in line with the value judgments of our equivalence scales. 
The privilege for low-income households with children is enormously expanded if we 
additionally consider TANF payments. This may be interpreted as a contradiction of value 
judgments between the federal system and the divergent tax and transfer systems on the state 
level.9 
For households with a middle-sized and high market income our results are not as decisive. In 
our baseline scenario, we find still a significant but smaller advantage for families and 
married couples. This privilege is driven by within-household-size economies in case of the 
absolute scale and, even more important, by the contribution ceilings of the old age, survivors 
and disability insurance affecting employment income. Thus, if social security taxes are 
excluded from our analysis (e.g. for the self-employed, see Appendix A), we obtain a 
tendency towards a more equal treatment. 
The privilege of middle income families is significantly smaller if employment income is 
evenly distributed among both spouses. Therefore, two-income-earner couples tend to be 
discriminated compared to couples with only one income earner by reason of the 
contributions ceilings of the old age, survivors and disability insurance. This is due to the fact 
that maximum contributions of dual-income earners are doubled, while corresponding 
benefits are typically not (Rennane and Steuerle, 2011). We do not find strong effects for 
higher market incomes on the state level. Thus, the analyzed state income taxes are broadly in 
line with the value judgments of the federal system. 
                                                 
9  It should be noted that there are large differences between TANF benefits of the different states considered. 
TANF is especially generous in California and New York and low in Florida and Texas (see table 4). 
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Our analysis implies contradictions in value judgments within the U.S. tax and transfer 
system. That holds especially for the strong public support for low income households with 
children, who in fact receive a form of a “child subsidy”. It seems to be an important question 
if this support can be justified by other aspects as horizontal equity. An important issue is the 
problem of child poverty (Rainwater and Smeeding, 2003; Pressman, 2011). As has been 
argued by Holzer et al. (2007) poverty implies large costs for the society by lowering 
productivity, increasing crime rates and raising health expenditures. Furthermore, it has to be 
noted that children are not able to care about themselves, but depend on the care of their 
parents and – as an alternative – the society. 
Nevertheless, it may be questionable if the strong focus of public support on households with 
children by the EIC, the child tax credit and TANF is a wise policy. As argued by this paper, a 
corresponding approach should not be in line with fairness concepts like horizontal equity. 
Furthermore, it has to be considered that providing a “child premium” for low-income 
families may result in suspect incentive effects for the poor. As the equivalent income of 
households with children is higher, having a child could be a strategy to obtain a higher level 
of material comfort for the adult household member. That holds especially for the first child 
as can be demonstrated by maximum benefits reported by Table 6. If corresponding 
behavioral reactions are strong, public support could even boost child poverty. 
We also found a privilege of family households and especially married couples with only one 
income earner, which is mainly induced by the contribution ceilings of the old age, survivors 
and disability insurance. A regressive component of a tax and transfer system necessarily 
implies a violation of horizontal equity. Potential strategies to overcome this inconsistency 
could be higher tax rates for households with market incomes exceeding $114,970 or an 
adaption of the contribution ceilings to the household size and the higher effective benefits of 
families as calculated by Steuerle and Rennane (2011). 
Finally, it has to be noted that the choice of the applied equivalence scales as well as the 
underlying assumptions of our approach have an impact on the ascertained outcome. Our 
results are based on value judgments inherent in the calculation of U.S. federal taxable 
income. In our baseline case, we interpret payments to the old age, survivors and disability 
insurance as well as to the hospital insurance as taxes. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis 
on clearly specified household types and rely on simplifying assumptions on the structure of 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  
Contrasting our baseline case, we do not consider social security taxes in our tax and transfer 
function F. This is for two reasons. First of all, social security taxes are not relevant for all 
groups of taxpayers. That holds especially for the self-employed. Second, it may be argued 
that contributions for social security taxes are at least partially outweighed by corresponding 
benefits.  
However, we account for these payments in calculating the market income. This may be 
justified as follows. If social security taxes are not regarded as taxes, they nevertheless 
increase the market income of an employee household. With regards to self-employed 
taxpayers, we implicitly assume that there exist similar fringe benefits being tax-exempt. This 
is to make different forms of earnings comparable to each other. The main effect of 
accounting for social security taxes in market income results in a reduction of the tax and 
transfer burden for all family types.  
The figures A1 and A2 depict the tax and transfer burden of households with one and two 
adults. Due to the neglect of social security taxes, the average burden and marginal burden are 
generally lower. Furthermore, the tax burden is not any more affected by the contribution 
ceiling for the old age, survivors and disability insurance of $114,970. 
 
[Figure A1 about here] 
 
[Figure A2 about here] 
 
Figure A3 documents the results for HE  excluding social security taxes. The corresponding 
outcome is largely the same for the absolute scale. However, that does not hold for the 
relative scale. In our baseline scenario, we obtain a clear privilege of family households and 
especially married couples by reason of the contribution ceilings of the old age, survivors and 
disability insurance. If we do not take into account this payment, there is even a slight 
disadvantage of all family types in case of the relative scale. Therefore, the inclusion of social 
security taxes has a significant impact on our results. 
 
Appendix B: Distribution of Earned Income 
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In our baseline specification, we assume that a single household member generates the 
family’s entire market income. This assumption simplifies our analysis but cannot be taken as 
realistic for households with two adults. As an alternative, we assume that the whole market 
income is split evenly in case of married joint filers (household types A2C0 to A2C3). In this 
case social security taxes are calculated for each income earner separately. This implies a 
doubling of the contribution ceilings for the household as a whole and, as a result, a double 
maximum payroll tax payment. 
On the contrary, the alternative distribution of income does only have a minory effect on the 
other subsystems of the tax and transfer system. Due to joint filing, there is no effect on the 
federal income tax. That holds also for most of the included state income taxes (an exception 
is for example Ohio). Furthermore, social transfer programs (SNAP, TANF) are calculated on 
the household level. Thus, the distribution of earned income within the household does not 
affect the provided benefits. Figure B1 depicts the federal tax and transfer burden if the 
earned income of married couples is split evenly on both spouses. 
 
[Figure B1 about here] 
 
We obtain a higher marginal and average burden for market incomes exceeding $114,970 by 
reason of the higher contribution ceilings. The HE  results for an alternative distribution of 
earned income are documented by Figure B2. It can be noted that the advantage of high-
income married joint filers in relation to the single are clearly smaller as in our baseline 
scenario. This implies a discrimination of two-income earners filing jointly compared to 
couples with exclusively one-income earner. 
 
[Figure B2 about here] 
 
Appendix C: State Tax and Transfer Systems 
The following figures present our results for HE regarding the states of Florida, Michigan, 
NewYork, Ohio and Texas. Similar to California, we concentrate on additional advantages 
and disadvantages on the state level. Our figures are restricted to a maximum additional 
relative change in post-tax equivalent income of 10 percentage points. We do this in order to 
account for the relatively small effects of state income taxes relevant for the whole range of 
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Table 1: Distribution of Household Types 
Household Type Distribution 
Adults Children  Frequency Percentage Cumulated 
1 0  61,879 14.85 14.85 
1 1  9,213 2.21 17.06 
1 2  10,102 2.42 19.48 
1 3  4,539 1.09 20.57 
2 0  100,721 24.18 44.75 
2 1  41,279 9.91 54.66 
2 2  58,672 14.08 68.74 
2 3  28,857 6.93 75.67 
Other  101,322 24.32 100.00 
Total  416,584 100.00  
Note: Composition of other households: one or two adults with four or more children 4.09%, 
three adults with no children 6.87%, three adults with one or more children 7.43%, four ore 
more adults with zero or more children 5.93%. 
Source: Cross-National Equivalent File Panel Study of Income Dynamics (CNEF-PSID) 
2011, wave 2007. All numbers are obtained with cross-sectional frequency weights. 
 
Table 2: Deductions and Equivalence Scales 
Household Type Deductions ($) Scale  
Adults Children  Standard Exemption Overall Relative  Absolute 
1 0  5,700 3,650 9,350 1.00 0 
1 1  8,400 7,300 15,700 1.68 6,350 
1 2  8,400 10,950 19,350 2.07 10,000 
1 3  8,400 14,600 23,000 2.46 13,650 
2 0  11,400 7,300 18,700 2.00 9,350 
2 1  11,400 10,950 22,350 2.39 13,000 
2 2  11,400 14,600 26,000 2.78 16,650 




Table 3: EIC Operating Numbers for the Year 2010 
Household Type  EIC Operating Numbers 









1 0  7.65 5,950 7.65 7,500 457 
1 1  34.00 8,950 15.98 16,450 3,050 
1 2  40.00 12,550 21.06 16,450 5,036 
1 3  45.00 12,550 21.06 16,450 5,666 
2 0  7.65 5,950 7.65 12,500 457 
2 1  34.00 8,950 15.98 21,500 3,050 
2 2  40.00 12,550 21.06 21,500 5,036 
2 3  45.00 12,550 21.06 21,500 5,666 
 Sources: I.R.C. §32; IRS (2010a); IRS (2010b).   
 
Table 4: SNAP Operating Numbers for the Year 2010 
Household Type  SNAP Operating Numbers per Year ($) 
Adults Children 







1 0  14,088 10,836 2,400
1 1  18,948 14,580 4,404
1 2  23,808 18,312 6,312
1 3  28,668 22,056 8,016
2 0  18,948 14,580 4,404
2 1  23,808 18,312 6,312
2 2  28,668 22,056 8,016
2 3  33,528 25,800 9,516
Source: USDA (2011). 
 
Table 5: TANF Maximum Benefits for the Year 2010 
Household Type  TANF Maximum Benefit per Year ($) 
Adults Children  California Florida Michigan New York Ohio Texas 
1 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1  7,524 2,892 4,836 6,576 4,260 2,316 
1 2  9,312 3,636 5,904 9,036 5,208 2,676 
1 3  11,076 4,368 7,164 10,860 6,432 3,216 
2 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1  9,312 3,636 5,904 9,036 5,208 2,940 
2 2  11,076 4,368 7,164 10,860 6,432 3,300 
2 3  12,600 5,112 8,328 12,756 7,524 3,828 
Sources: Urban Institute data base; TANF state regulations 
 
Table 6: Public Transfers (SNAP and TANF) on Federal and State Level 
Household Type Maximum Benefit ($) 
Adults Children Federal California Florida Michigan New York Ohio Texas 
1 0 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 
1 1 4,404 11,928 7,296 9,240 10,980 8,664 6,720 
1 2 6,312 15,624 9,948 12,216 15,348 11,520 8,988 
1 3 8,016 19,092 12,384 15,180 18,876 14,448 11.232 
2 0 4,404 4,404 4,404 4,404 4,404 4,404 4,404 
2 1 6,312 15,624 9,948 12,216 15,348 11,520 9,252 
2 2 8,016 19,092 12,394 15,180 18,876 14,448 11,316 




Table 7: Horizontal Equity Effects for Households with Zero Market Income 
Household Type HE Values 
Adults Children Federal California Florida Michigan New York Ohio Texas 
1 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 1 1.09 2.96 1.81 2.29 2.72 2.15 1.67 
1 2 1.27 3.14 2.00 2.46 3.09 2.32 1.81 
1 3 1.36 3.23 2.10 2.57 3.20 2.45 1.90 
2 0 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
2 1 1.10 2.72 1.73 2.13 2.68 2.01 1.61 
2 2 1.20 2.86 1.86 2.28 2.83 2.17 1.70 
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Figure A1: Absolute and Marginal Burden (excluding Social Security Taxes),  


























0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
market income
A1C3
average burden marginal burden
 
 
Figure A2: Absolute and Marginal Burden (excluding Social Security Taxes),  
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